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Making sense 
of fair-value 
accounting 
In today's heightened uncertainty, what is 
needed is  more transparency, not less 
By ANDREW LEE 
and LiM CHU YEONG 
F INANCIAL mar- kets have long been regarded as the paragon of perfect com- petition. When there are many buyers and sell- 
ers and there is an ade- 
quate flow of information. 
the market price of an asset 
reflects the collective wis- 
dom of all participants and 
represents fairIy its intrin- 
sic value. 
Of course, markets can 
still function reasonably 
well even if they are not ide- 
ally perfect. They just need 
to be sufficiently competi- 
tive. 
However, when critical 
conditions for perfect com- 
pet i t ion a r e  badly 
breached, markets break 
down; buyers and sellers 
become extremely hesitant 
to trade or they disappear 
from the market complete- 
ly; prices fluctuate outra- 
geously and they no longer 
reflect fairly intrinsic val- 
ues. Economists term this 
phenomenon a market fail- 
ure. 
We clearly see thisin the 
recent state of credit mar- 
kets, where bid-ask 
spreads widen, default risk 
premiums surge even for 
hitherto strong borrowers, 
and banks become very re- 
luctant to lend even to one 
another. Market liquidity 
evaporates on heightened 
concerns and lack of infor- 
mation about the true quali- 
ty of the financial assets as 
well as the ability of coun- 
terparties of financial con- 
tracts to honour their corn- 
mitments. 
Proponents of fair-value 
accounting standards, intro- 
duced over the last decade, 
have always argued that 
recognising financial assets 
and liabilities at their fair 
values on an entity's finan- 
cial staiernents would pro- 
vide more relevant informa- 
tion to investors than histor- 
ical cost numbers. Numer- 
ous academic studies have 
also found evidgnce in sup- 
port of this argument. 
But the fair-value ac- 
counting model is not with- 
out its limitations. Fair- 
value accounting may be 
fraught with difficulties 
when asset markets are in- 
active or non-existent. 
Accounting standards 
acknowledge this. For in- 
stance, where asset mar- 
kets are inactive, interna- 
tional accounting stand- 
ards permit entities to 
adopt mark-to-model ac- 
counting in place of 
mark-to-market account- 
ing. Under mark-to-model 
accounting, an entity uses 
fair values, estimated from 
generally accepted valua- 
tion models, as proxies for , 
actual market values. 
Under US accounting 
standards, entities also 
have to segregate the fair 
values of their financial in- 
struments into three differ- 
ent hierarchical levels: 
+ Level 1 fair values are 
those obtained directly 
from quoted prices in active 
markets. These values are 
considered to be objective 
and unbiased. An exampie 
would be shares listed and 
actively traded on a stock 
exchange. 
+ Level 2 fair values are 
those that are not directly 
obtained from quoted pric- 
es but can be derived from 
observable market data. An 
example would be plain-va- 
nilla interest rate swaps 
based on Libor swap rates. 
+ Level 3 fair values are 
those that cannot be ob- 
tained or derived from ob- 
servable market data but 
are determined using inter- 
nal valuation models. 
hence the term mark-to- 
model. An example would 
be asset-backed securities 
that are not actively traded. 
Most issues in practical 
applications of fair-value ac- 
counting arise from Level 3 
(and at times Level 2) esti- 
mates. Such estimates are 
subject to differences in as- 
sumptions on models and 
parameters. 
Despite the inherent dif- 
ficulties of Level 2 and Lev- 
el 3 fair-value estimates, 
we are of the view that they 
are better than no esti- 
mates at all, as long as ade- 
quate controls are in place 
to mitigate the difficulties. 
That these estimates are 
not precise is no different 
from the many other esti- 
mates in accounting. such 
as provisions. 
Banks have in-house val- 
uation specialists to deter- 
mine the fair values of their 
financial instruments, and 
auditors assess, among oth- 
er  things, whether the 
bank's valuation function is 
sufficiently independent of 
its front office. Some audit 
firms may also engage their 
own in-house valuation ex- 
perts to further assess the 
reasonableness of the 
banks' fair-value estimates. 
Governance issue 
Of course, it is possible that 
entities under extreme pres- 
sure to deliver favourable 
performance might still 
temper with such esti- 
mates. But this is more an 
issue of governance than 
valuation. 
To enhance transparen- 
cy, we think that entities 
should disclose more de- 
tails and breakdown on the 
valuation of their financial 
instruments. including 
their related movements 
and recognised fair-value 
changes, at each hierarchi- 
cal level. 
The basis and assump- 
tions behind such fair-val- 
ue estimates should also be 
disclosed. Investors can 
then assess for themselves 
the extent to which they are 
prepared to rely on the dif- 
REUTERS 
Regulatws' role: With markets now suffering from a coqfidence crisis, the 
immediate task is for regulators to restore confidence und stabilise markets 
ferent types of fair-value 
numbers. 
Some critics have recent- 
ly suggested that fair-value 
accounting has contributed 
to the current turmoil in fi- 
nancial markets and should 
be suspended. They argue 
that insistence on fair-val- 
ue accounting rules has re- 
sulted in writedowns of !I- 
nancial assets by entities 
that not only grossly under- 
estimate their true intrinsic 
values but also exacerbate 
the price meltdowns of simi- 
lar assets or even of the enti- 
ties' own shares. 
However, such argu- 
ments, if valid, should also 
apply during times of rising 
prices. To say that fair-val- 
ue accounting is flawed 
when prices are falling pre- 
cipitously but works well 
when prices are rising 
would be biased. It de- 
stroys the very neutrality of 
accounting. 
If fair-value estimates 
are suppressed for an asset 
class as ubiquitous as finan- 
cial instruments, account- 
ing would not fulfil its role 
of providing relevant infor- 
mation to investors. If fair 
values are problematic be- 
cause of illiquid or abnor- 
mal market conditions, 
then what we need may be 
greater transparency and 
disclosure as well as a 
more effective market 
mechanism for mitigating 
counterparty and settle- 
ment risk. 
It is interesting to note 
that while credit markets es- 
pecially in the United States 
have substantially frozen 
during the recent turmoil. 
equity and currency mar- 
kets continue to function 
quite effectively. Despite 
surging volatility and fall- 
ing equity prices, trading in 
equities and currencies has 
not evaporated and trades 
continue to be cleared and 
settled efficiently. 
Traditionally. many 
credit products have been 
traded over the counter 
rather than through organ- 
ised exchanges. But over- 
the-counter markets gener- 
ally lack transparency and 
the discipline of organised 
exchanges. Many credit de- 
rivatives and asset-backed 
securities also have 
non-standard features. 
making uniform analysis 
dficult and increasing the 
opacity of information 
about asset quality. 
The opacity of these 
"dark pools" of liquidity (as 
some such "markets" are 
called) enables dealers to 
trade without having to re- 
veal to the market the infor- 
mation implied by their 
trading. This may have con- 
tributed to the exponential 
growth ~f instruments such 
as credit derivatives, which 
grew from US$180 billion 
in 1996 to some US$55 tril- 
lion currently. 
But when a fmancial cri- 
sis erupts, opacity becomes 
a serious problem, as little 
information would be avail- 
able of the extent of concen- 
tration risk exposure in the 
market, participants would 
flee from trading, and a 
market failure would re- 
sult. 
It was recently reported 
that the US government is 
now considering creating a 
central clearing house for 
credit default swaps. This 
is a step in the right direc- 
tion as it would potentially 
reduce counterparty settle- 
ment risk and free the log- 
jam in credit markets. 
For now, markets are 
suffering from a confidence 
crisis, so the immediate 
task is for regulators to re- 
store confidence and stabi- 
lise markets. Still, in times 
of heightened uncertainty, 
what is needed for markets 
to function effectively is 
more transparency, not 
less. Fair-value accounting 
helps achieve this by deliv- 
ering relevant information 
to investors. 
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